Preferences are de…ned over payo¤s that are contingent on a …nite number of states representing a horse race (Knightian uncertainty) and a roulette (objective risk). The class of scale-invariant (SI) ambiguity-averse preferences, in a broad sense, is uniquely characterized by a multiple-prior utility representation. Adding a weak certainty independence axiom is shown to imply either unit CRRA toward roulette risk or SI maxmin expected utility. Removing the weak independence axiom but adding a separability assumption on preferences over pure horse-race bets leads to source-dependent constant-relative-risk-aversion expected utility with a higher CRRA assigned to horserace uncertainty than to roulette risk. The multiple-prior representation in this case is shown to generalize entropic variational preferences. An appendix characterizes the functional forms associated with SI ambiguity-averse preferences in terms of suitable weak independence axioms in place of scale invariance.
Introduction
Assuming we agree to use the de…nition of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for ambiguity aversion (without their certainty-independence axiom), this paper characterizes all preferences within a broad class that are ambiguity averse and scale invariant (or homothetic). Ambiguity aversion means aversion to Knightian uncertainty, as is commonly motivated by the experiments of Ellsberg (1961) . Scale invariance means that the ranking of any two contingent payo¤s is not reversed if all amounts are scaled by the same constant. Scale invariance is ubiquitous in models 1 of macroeconomics and …nance as it provides the simplest reasonably realistic way of capturing wealth e¤ects. For example, increasingly common in economic modeling is the use of Epstein-Zin-Weil utility, 2 whose certainty equivalent (CE) corresponds to expected utility with a constant coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), the only possible type of homothetic expected utility. Suppose we are interested in relaxing the assumption of an expected-utility CE, while requiring ambiguity aversion, without sacri…cing scale invariance. What CE parameterizations should we consider? This paper gives a parsimonious answer to this question based on a simple axiomatic foundation.
Although the paper's main results do not include probabilities among their primitives, let us temporarily focus on the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) type setup of a preference order on state-contingent objective lotteries. The states can be thought of as outcomes of a horse race and the lotteries as roulette bets, the idea being that it is easier to assign probabilities to roulette outcomes than to horse-race outcomes. Ambiguity aversion implies that the agent is less averse to roulette uncertainty than to horse-race uncertainty. A seminal contribution that quanti…es this idea is Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , henceforth GS, whose Uncertainty Aversion axiom A.5 forms the basis for the de…nition of uncertainty aversion in this paper, too (albeit without reference to objective probabilities). GS also assume what they call Certainty Independence, which is key in generating their familiar multiple-prior representation. If the assumptions of this paper's …rst theorem were inter-1 Scale invariance is behind Gorman aggregation and the associated representative-agent arguments, is an essential component of balanced growth models, and generally lends numerical tractability by reducing a model's dimensionality even in models with agent heterogeneity. 2 The utility of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) is a parameterization of homothetic Kreps and Porteus (1978) utility, which includes expected discounted power or logarithmic utility. Another widely used preference class, exempli…ed by expected discounted exponential utility, is characterized by translation invariance relative to a constant consumption stream. (See Chapter 6 of Skiadas (2009) for the corresponding recursive-utility formulation.) The analysis of translation-invariant preferences also reduces to the scaleinvariant case by passing to log-consumption.
preted in the GS setting, they would essentially 3 amount to replacing certainty independence with scale invariance. The resulting multiple-prior utility representation associates a unique CRRA with roulette risk. For = 1; the utility form is within the variational class studied by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) , henceforth MMR. For 6 = 1; the utility form is similar to (but not the same as) multiplicatively variational representations appearing in Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) , henceforth CF, and Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2008) , henceforth CMMM. Whereas GS, MMR, CF and CMMM 4 derive functional forms for aggregating horse-race uncertainty using some type of weak independence axiom, in this paper's central theorem similar utility structures are derived as a consequence of scale invariance, without any weak independence axiom. The paper's central representation theorem is specialized in two di¤erent directions. The …rst direction clari…es the role of conditions that are the analogs of GS's certainty independence (CI) and MMR's weak certainty independence (WCI), which are used to characterize the scale-invariant case of maxmin expected utility (MEU) and variational preferences. Introducing CI naturally implies MEU with a power-or-logarithmic von NeumannMorgenstern index. What is less clear is how this MEU representation relates to the main result's multiplicatively variational representation for 6 = 1: The answer is given in terms of a concrete expression that provides an alternative functional representation of MEU. Introducing WCI naturally results in the scale invariant case of variational preferences in the sense of MMR, but more can be said. If = 1; corresponding to logarithmic variational preferences, then WCI is redundant, in the sense that it is a necessary condition of scale invariance and the other assumptions of the main representation theorem. If 6 = 1; then WCI is equivalent to CI. In other words, for non-unit CRRA toward roulette risk, the scale-invariant case of MMR-type preferences does not take us beyond MEU.
The second direction in which the paper's central theorem is specialized leaves out any form of a weak independence axiom, and instead imposes separability of preferences over pure horse-race contingent payo¤s. The result is source-dependent constant relative risk aversion, with the CRRA associated with horse-race uncertainty being potentially higher than the CRRA associated with roulette risk. The utility form in this case is within a class 3 Increasing preferences and strictly positive consumption are also assumed. 4 The reference here is to Theorem 26 of CMMM, which is not the paper's main focus. The main contribution of CMMM is the application of a general form of quasiconcave duality to establish a uni…ed multiple-prior representation of ambiguity-averse preferences in the GS setting, without any weak independence axiom. As explained in Section B.3, the duality results in the present paper build on the CMMM duality, based on the implications of scale invariance.
of source-dependent expected utility appearing in Nau (2006) and Ergin and Gul (2009) (see also Chew and Sagi (2008) ). It also corresponds to the earlier formulation of Schroder and Skiadas (2003) in the context of continuous-time recursive utility (as shown in Skiadas (2011) ). Put in the variational form of the central representation theorem, this utility class results in a new parametric speci…cation, which converges to the entropic variational utility of Hansen and Sargent (2001) as the CRRA toward roulette risk converges to one. The unit-CRRA case overlaps with the analysis of Strzalecki (2011) . The novel variational representations for MEU and source-dependent CRRA provide a formal link between the two.
Although unrelated to the issue of ambiguity aversion, it is worth noting that the paper's main theorem embeds a simpli…ed axiomatic foundation for scale-invariant subjective expected utility (SEU) with a …nite state space. Assuming more than two states, it is shown that if a preference order over state-contingent payo¤s is continuous, increasing and satis…es a separability condition that allows the application of Debreu's additive representation theorem, then scale-invariance is equivalent to the existence of a unique probability and a constant-relative-risk-aversion expected utility representation relative to this probability. In contrast, an SEU axiomatization without scale invariance requires considerably more structure, whether it be that of Savage (1954) , Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , or any of the SEU foundations building on the theory of additive conjoint measurement, as in the contributions of Luce and Krantz (1971) and Wakker (1984 Wakker ( , 1989 . In a variant of the latter approach, Skiadas (1997 , 2009 separates the conditions leading to an additive representation and a single, but rather elaborate, state-independence condition that delivers SEU. Here the simple ordinal condition of scale invariance entirely substitutes for state independence, and further implies (globally) constant risk attitudes and smoothness. This result has essentially been noted in Theorem 3.37 of Skiadas (2009) under a minor non-ordinal regularity assumption, which is dispensed with in this paper. Section B.1 provides details, along with further discussion of related literature.
Scale invariance plays two roles in this paper. For preferences over roulette payo¤s it helps pin down an SEU representation and associated CRRA : Given the latter and a preference assumption, general payo¤s can be equivalently represented as horse-race contingent utility levels. The second role of scale invariance is to put structure on the function that takes these contingent utility levels as input and gives the utility of the whole payo¤ as output. In GS, MMR, CF and related papers, such structure is inferred from assumed weak independence axioms. Scale invariance restricts the type of weak independence axiom that can be assumed. For = 1; WCI is necessary. For 6 = 1; CI must hold if WCI is assumed. For 6 = 1 without WCI, the functional structure implied by scale invariance does not correspond exactly to any weak independence axiom in the literature, but it can nevertheless be characterized in terms of new weak independence conditions, which are similar to Axiom 5 of CF and Axiom 10 of CMMM, as spelled out in Appendix A.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the preference restrictions that are adopted throughout the main part of the paper. Section 3 presents the central representation theorem, which is related to MEU and CI in Section 4, and to variational preferences and WCI in Section 5. The theory of source-dependent constant relative risk aversion is presented in Section 6. The role of Appendix A was pointed out in the preceding paragraph, Appendix B proves the main results, and Appendix C collects proofs omitted up to that point in the paper.
Scale-invariant ambiguity-averse preferences
There are two sources of uncertainty, represented by the two factors of the state space f1; : : : ; Rg f1; : : : ; Sg ; where R > 2:
Informally, we think of 1; : : : ; S as states representing Knightian uncertainty, for example, the possible outcomes of a horse race. We think of 1; : : : ; R as states representing better understood uncertainty, for example, the possible outcomes of a roulette spin. A generic element of the state space, or just state, is denoted (r; s) : We refer to elements (subsets) of f1; : : : ; Rg as roulette states (events) and to elements (subsets) of f1; : : : ; Sg as horse-race states (events).
A payo¤ is any mapping of the form x : f1; : : : ; Rg f1; : : : ; Sg ! (0; 1) ; with x (r; s) or x s r denoting the value of x at state (r; s) : We write X for the set of all payo¤s, which we identify with (0; 1) R S : A roulette payo¤ is any payo¤ x whose value is a function of the roulette outcome only, that is, x (r; s) = x (r; s 0 ) for all r 2 f1; : : : ; Rg and s; s 0 2 f1; : : : ; Sg : If x is a roulette payo¤, we write x r instead of x s r : Analogously, a payo¤ x is a horse-race payo¤ if x (r; s) = x (r 0 ; s) for all r; r 0 2 f1; : : : ; Rg and s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg ; in which case we write x s instead of x s r : The set of all roulette (resp. horse-race) payo¤s is denoted X R (resp. X S ) and is identi…ed with (0; 1) R (resp. (0; 1) S ). So while X R and X S are subsets of X; we also think of a payo¤ x as an R-by-S matrix, whose columns, denoted x 1 ; : : : ; x S ; are roulette payo¤s. For any x; y 2 X and roulette event B; x B y denotes the payo¤
Note that x; y 2 X R implies x B y 2 X R :
The central object of study is a binary relation on the set of payo¤s X; representing an agent's preferences: x y means that the agent strictly prefers x to y: As usual, the corresponding relations and on X are de…ned by [x y () not y x] and [x y () x y and y x] : The restriction of on X R is denoted R :
x R y () x; y 2 X R and x y:
The following de…nition lists properties of that will be imposed in each of the main representation theorems in this paper.
De…nition 1 The relation is
increasing if for all x; y 2 X; x 6 = y x implies y x:
continuous if for all x 2 X; the sets fy : y xg and fy : x yg are open. a preference order if is complete 5 and transitive. 6 scale invariant if x y implies x y for all 2 (0; 1) :
R -monotone if for all x; y 2 X; x s R y s for all s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg =) x y:
ambiguity averse if for all x; y 2 X S ;
x y =) x B y x for every roulette event B:
The …rst three conditions are commonplace, while the fourth condition is the familiar homotheticity condition; it formalizes the notion of scale invariance that along with ambiguity aversion is this paper's focal point. The last two conditions of De…nition 1 are 5 The relation is complete if for all x; y 2 (0; 1) n ; either x y or y x: 6 The relation is transitive if x y and y z implies x z:
analogous to assumptions A.4 and A.5 of GS. R -monotonicity requires that the agent prefers payo¤ x to payo¤ y if for every horse-race outcome s; the roulette payo¤ x s is preferred to roulette payo¤ y s : This is not an innocuous assumption, but we will follow GS and the related literature in adopting it. Ambiguity aversion requires that if the agent is indi¤erent between horse-race payo¤s x and y; then the agent (weakly) prefers to spin the roulette and select x if the ball settles in B and y otherwise. (The condition corresponds to that of "second-order risk aversion" in Ergin and Gul (2009) and Strzalecki (2011) .) A commonly used illustration is as follows.
Example 2 There are only two horses (S = 2) ; about which the agent has no information. Suppose x = (100; 1) and y = (1; 100) are horse-race payo¤ s. The agent's indi¤ erence between x and y re ‡ects the symmetry of the situation but conceals the agent's discomfort with the fact that the probability of horse one winning is unknown. Suppose also that B is a roulette event that the agent knows to have probability one half. Then x B y pays a hundred or one with equal probability, for any given value of : For this reason, x B y is preferred to either x or y:
The preceding restrictions on imply that R is an increasing, continuous, scaleinvariant preference order on X R . We will further assume that R is separable.
De…nition 3
The relation R is separable if for all x; y; z; z 0 2 X R and B f1; : : : ; Rg ;
In the representation theorems to follow, R has a power-or-logarithmic expected utility representation relative to a unique probability over roulette outcomes. Such a representation of R follows from the assumption that R is an increasing, continuous, scale-invariant and separable preference order. The argument can be found as Theorem 17 in Appendix B.
Main representation theorem
This section presents the paper's central theorem, which characterizes all preference orders on X with the properties listed in De…nitions 1 and 3. Subsequent results specialize this section's representation by imposing additional preference restrictions.
The following terminology and notation is used to state this section's theorem, as well as throughout the rest of this paper.
A certainty equivalent (CE) is any increasing 7 and continuous function of the form : X ! (0; 1) satisfying 8 ( 1) = for all 2 (0; 1) : The CE is said to represent if (x) > (y) is equivalent to x y: For any positive integer n; we write
and n for the closure of n ; that is, n = fp 2 [0; 1] n :
S ) is the set of all priors over roulette (resp. horse-race) states that assign a positive mass to every state.
Given any scalar ; we write u for the real-valued function on (0; 1) de…ned by
This will serve as a convenient choice of a von Neumann-Morgenstern index with constant CRRA ; representing risk aversion toward roulette risk. Note that the image set of u ; denoted u (0; 1) ; is equal to (0; 1) if < 1; R if = 1; and ( 1; 0) if > 1: Finally, we de…ne a set C of functions over horse-race priors, whose role is similar to those appearing in the variational utility forms of MMR and CF. The de…nition of C is contingent on the CRRA in a way that re ‡ects the image set u (0; 1) : De…nition 4 Given any 2 R; C denotes the set of all functions C on S with the following properties: If = 1; then min C = 0 and C is the restriction to S of a convex lower semicontinuous function C : S ! R + [ f1g :
If < 1; then C is valued in [1; 1) ; min C = 1 and 1=C is concave.
If > 1; then C is valued in (0; 1] ; max C = 1 and 1=C is convex.
Note that for every C 2 C with 6 = 1; both C and 1=C are …nite-valued and continuous 9 . For any C; C in C ; the notation C C means C (q) C (q) for all q 2 S :
The paper's central result follows.
Theorem 5 Assuming R > 2; the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. is a continuous, increasing, scale-invariant, R -monotone and ambiguity-averse preference order, and R is separable.
2. The CE : X ! (0; 1) representing exists and takes the form
for some p 2 R ; 2 R and C 2 C :
Assuming the two conditions are satis…ed, the parameters p and are unique, and the function C can be uniquely selected to have the property: If representation (3) is also valid with any C : S ! R + [ f1g in place of C; then C C if 1; and C C if > 1:
We henceforth refer to the C 2 C of representation (3) with the preceding property as the unique extremal C (meaning minimal if 1 and maximal if > 1). For = 1; representation (3) is within the utility class characterized by MMR, whose Proposition 6 implies that the corresponding C is in fact unique 10 in C 1 (without the requirement of minimality). We will return to the relationship between the preceding theorem and MMR in Section 5. For 6 = 1; representation (3) is closely related to but di¤erent than the representation of CF and its extension by CMMM, as further explained in Appendix A.
While a complete proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix B, some of the underlying ideas are worth discussing here, as they lead to a better appreciation of the result and its relationship to the literature. We focus on the nontrivial implication 1 =) 2; and we proceed under the assumption that satis…es the theorem's condition 1 and is the CE representing :
The theorem's condition 1, therefore, must imply that R admits an expected utility representation with prior 1 0 The uniqueness of C within C1 if = 1 will be seen in the course of the proof of Theorem 5 (see Remark 24) to be a consequence of the Fenchel-Legendre duality that is behind the MMR representation. The multiplicative version of this duality used for 6 = 1 does not generally imply the uniqueness of C within C : For instance, one can take the case > 1 in Example 9 and modify C by rotating upward the sloped sections of the graph of 1=C in Figure 1 while keeping the ‡at section the same. The requirement that C be extremal uniquely pins down C: p and a constant CRRA : This fact, which is proved in Section B.1, is the starting point of the proof of condition 2 given condition 1. (Note also that Theorem 17 of Section B.1, whose relationship to the foundations of SEU was discussed in the Introduction, is the special case of Theorem 5 obtained by setting S = 1 and R = n:) Similarly to GS, an argument that hinges on the assumption that is R -monotone shows that there is an increasing, continuous function f : u (0; 1) S ! u (0; 1) such that u (x) = f (y 1 ; : : : ; y S ) ; where y s = P r p r u (x s r ) : In other words, the utility of the payo¤ x can be determined by …rst reducing x to an equivalent horse-race payo¤ y measured in utils, and then computing f (y) : As in GS, ambiguity aversion is easily seen to be equivalent to the quasiconcavity of f: The central question is, what else can be said about the functional form of f ?
Let us call f scale-invariant (SI) if it is homogeneous of degree one, and translationinvariant (TI) if it is quasilinear with respect to the sure payo¤ 1: If f is quasiconcave and either SI or TI, it must also be concave. In GS, the certainty-independence axiom implies that f is both SI and TI. In this case, conjugate duality (in the sense of Section 12 of Rockafellar (1970) ) leads to the MEU functional form f (y) = min q2K q y for a nonempty, closed, convex K S : MMR weakened certainty independence in a way that implies that f is TI but not necessarily SI. Conjugate duality in this case leads to the functional form f (y) = min q2 S q y + C (q) for some C 2 C 1 :
Certainty independence and its weaker version are discussed in the following two sections, but neither is assumed here; we rely on scale invariance instead. For = 1; the fact that u = log and scale invariance of imply that f must be TI, resulting in an MMR-type representation in the …rst part of (3) : For 6 = 1; the fact that u is a power function and scale invariance of imply that f must be SI. A corresponding duality theory in this case, developed in Appendix B, leads to the functional form f (y) = min q2 S (q y) C (q) for some C 2 C , and hence the second part of representation (3) : A subtlety in this argument involves showing that in the last representation C and 1=C are …nite-valued.
As this outline suggests, scale invariance restricts the type of weak independence axiom that can be assumed in a way that depends on the value of : If = 1; then scale invariance implies that f is TI, a property that is characterized by the weak certainty-independence axiom of MMR, discussed in Section 5. If 6 = 1; then scale invariance implies that f is SI, a property that can also be characterized in terms of a certain weak independence axiom, closely related to an axiom …rst introduced by CF. This alternative way of characterizing the SI property of f is developed in Appendix A.
Scale invariance with certainty independence
The purpose of this section is to clarify the relationship between the representation of Theorem 5 and the scale-invariant case of the MEU representation characterized by GS. The essential assumption that GS make and does not appear in Theorem 5 is certainty independence. An analogous 11 condition in the current setting is the following. We write for the constant payo¤ that takes the value 2 (0; 1) at every state.
Certainty Independence (CI) For any horse-race payo¤ s x; y; roulette events A; B; and 2 (0; 1) ;
The motivation behind certainty independence is that roulette mixing with a constant payo¤ cannot provide the type of hedging with respect to lack of knowledge of the prior suggested by the ambiguity-aversion condition and illustrated in Example 2. Theorem 6 below specializes the representation of Theorem 5 by adding certainty independence, using the notation:
Theorem 6 Assuming R > 2; the following three conditions are equivalent:
1. In addition to condition 1 of Theorem 5, satis…es Certainty Independence.
for some 2 R; p 2 R and K 2 K:
1 1 GS adopt a di¤erent formal setting of preferences over acts that are horse-race contingent objective probability distributions. Moreover, their certainty-independence condition is postulated relative to any acts x; y; not necessarily pure horse-race payo¤s, as assumed in condition CI here. In the presence of our other assumptions, the latter di¤erence is immaterial.
3. Condition 2 of Theorem 5 holds with C 2 C de…ned in terms of a set K 2 K by 12
Assuming the three conditions are satis…ed, the parameters ; p and K are unique, and (5) de…nes the unique extremal C 2 C consistent with representation (3) :
Remark 7 The equivalence of (4) and (3) with C de…ned in (5) remains true if the function u is replaced by any function u : (0; 1) ! R with the same image set as u :
The argument leading to representation (4) is closely related to that of GS, as outlined in the discussion following Theorem 5. The third condition transforms the familiar representation of GS to one that …ts within the unifying representation of Theorem 5. The proof of Theorem 6 in Appendix B shows that expression (5) is an easy consequence of the duality behind the proof of Theorem 5. It is worth noting, however, a direct proof of the equivalence of conditions 2 and 3 of Theorem 6, as well as of Remark 7, based on the following proposition, whose simple proof can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 8 Given any K 2 K and y 2 (0; 1) S ;
The result remains true if the roles of min and max are interchanged.
The equivalence of representations (4) and (3) with C de…ned in (5) is a corollary of this proposition. If < 1; then the image set u (0; 1) is (0; 1) and the claim follows by applying identity (6) with y s = P r p r u (x s r ) : If > 1; then u (0; 1) = ( 1; 0) and the claim follows by applying the dual identity to (6) obtained by interchanging max and min : The case = 1 is obvious. This argument only depends on u through its image set, thus verifying Remark 7.
We close the section with an example illustrating the membership of the function C de…ned in (5) to the set C de…ned in the last section. Example 9 Suppose S = 2 and the CE is given by the following special case of (4) :
for some p 2 R and CRRA : An equivalent representation (3) also holds with C computed in (5) : For = 1; C 2 C 1 is de…ned by
For 6 = 1; a simple calculation shows that (5) implies
The above function is graphed as the piecewise linear dashed lines in Figure 1 , with the case < 1 corresponding to the bottom, thin line and the case > 1 corresponding to the top, thick line. The diagram clearly illustrates the fact that C 2 C : The superimposed curves of Figure 1 are analogous examples of 1=C for a speci…cation with source-dependent CRRA that is developed in Section 6.
Scale invariance with weak certainty independence
The GS characterization of MEU was extended by MMR to a class of variational preferences by weakening the certainty-independence axiom of GS. The analogous weakening of CI in our setting (similarly to A2'in Strzalecki (2011)) is Weak Certainty Independence (WCI) For any horse-race payo¤ s x; y; roulette event B; and 2 (0; 1) ;
CI implies WCI, corresponding to the fact that the GS preference class is a subset of the MMR preference class. In contrast to CI, WCI allows the possibility that x A 1 y A 1 but not x B 1 y B 1; for some roulette events A; B: For example, suppose A is highly unlikely and B is certain, while x is more ambiguous but also more promising than y: It is conceivable that the agent is able to tolerate the ambiguity of x if there is only a tiny probability attached to it, but not if it is the whole bet. Assuming roulette probabilities p 2 R and a constant CRRA toward roulette risk, the MMR representation of a CE ; adapted to the current setting, takes the form
for some C 2 C 1 : Clearly, if has a CE representation of the form (7), then WCI must hold. The MEU form (4) is obtained by setting C = K : Note that for 6 = 1; the C of representation (7) is not the same type of object as the C of representation (3) : MMR used weak certainty independence to characterize representation (7) with a general von Neumann-Morgenstern index u in place of u : The conditions of the main Theorem 5 not only imply that u = u for some ; but also restrict the role of WCI and the associated representation (7) as follows.
Theorem 10 Suppose the two equivalent conditions of Theorem 5 are satis…ed.
(a) If = 1; then Weak Certainty Independence is necessarily satis…ed. If 6 = 1; then Weak Certainty Independence is satis…ed if and only if Certainty Independence is satis…ed (in which case Theorem 6 applies).
(b) For any C 2 C 1 ; the CE admits the representation (7) if and only if either C = K for some K 2 K; or = 1 and C equals the C of representation (3) :
Part (a) says that given the conditions of Theorem 5, WCI is redundant if = 1 and equivalent to CI if 6 = 1: Theorem 10 restricted to the case = 1 is a corollary of Theorem 5, since representations (3) and (7) coincide if = 1: To see the simple idea behind Theorem 10 for 6 = 1; recall the discussion following Theorem 5, where it was pointed out that the variational representation (7) results from a convex dual representation of the function f under the assumption that f is TI, a property that is equivalent to WCI (see Lemma 20(c)). If 6 = 1; scale invariance implies that f must also be SI, but the case in which f is both TI and SI corresponds to MEU, characterized by CI. For this reason, if 6 = 1; WCI implies CI and representation (7) reduces to MEU.
6 Source-dependent CRRA
In the last two sections, the scale-invariant and ambiguity-averse preference class of Theorem 5 was specialized by imposing conditions CI or WCI. In this section, the same class of preferences is specialized in another direction by imposing separability on preferences over (pure) horse-race payo¤s, without any weak independence axiom. The result is a utility representation in which both preferences on horse-race payo¤s and preferences on roulette payo¤s admit a constant-relative-risk-aversion expected-utility representation with a unique prior. The key feature of the representation is that the CRRA assigned to horserace payo¤s can be higher than the CRRA assigned to roulette-payo¤s, as a re ‡ection of ambiguity aversion. Of course, the dual, multiple-prior representation (3) remains valid in this case, for a function C that is speci…ed below. For = 1; C takes the form of relative entropy, corresponding to a well-studied class of entropic variational preferences. For 6 = 1; the function C takes a new form that generalizes the entropic speci…cation, which can be obtained by letting approach one. We use the following extension of earlier notation and terminology. For any x; y 2 X S and A f1; : : : ; Sg ; x A y denotes the horse-race payo¤ de…ned by
We let S denote the restriction of to the set of horse-race payo¤s:
x S y () x; y 2 X S and x y:
We say that S is separable if for every x; y; z; z 0 2 X S and A f1; : : : ; Sg ;
Theorem 11 Assuming R; S > 2; the following three conditions are equivalent:
1. Condition 1 of Theorem 5 is satis…ed and S is separable.
2. There exist (p; ) 2 R R and (p;^ ) 2 S R with^ such that the CE representing is given by
3. Condition 2 of Theorem 5 is satis…ed with C given in terms ofp 2 S as follows:
where the cases 2 f0; 1g are computed by taking a corresponding limit:
Assuming these equivalent conditions are satis…ed, all parameters in conditions 2 and 3 are unique, the parameters p;p and are common between the two conditions, and the remaining parameters are related by
Remark 12 The following extensions of Theorem 11 are also shown in its proof.
(a) Conditions 1 and 2 remain equivalent if ambiguity aversion is omitted in condition 1 and the requirement^ is omitted in condition 2. In this case, is ambiguity averse if and only if^ : (b) The equivalence of conditions 2 and 3 is valid without the assumption R; S > 2:
Representation (8) is within a class of source-dependent expected utilities studied by Ergin and Gul (2009) and Nau (2006) (which should not to be confused with the second-order expected utility studied by Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) ). Here scale invariance provides more structure and simpli…es the axiomatic foundations. As explained in Skiadas (2011) , a continuous-time version of representation (8) already appears in Schroder and Skiadas (2003) , albeit without a decision-theoretic foundation. The dual representation for = 1 is an instance of the entropic variational preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) , and the preceding characterization is consistent with Strzalecki (2011) . For 6 = 1; the dual representation is (to my knowledge) new and extends the case = 1; which can be obtained as a limiting version by letting ! 1; as outlined in the following remark.
Remark 13 Let be the CE of the second condition of Theorem 11. The restriction of to the set of horse-race payo¤ s is the expected-utility CE S (x) = u 1 ( P sp s u^ (x s )) ; x 2 X S : For = 1; the fact that (8) is equivalent to (3) with C given in (9) is equivalent to the well-known identity
with the convention 1 0 = 0: For 6 = 1; the fact that (8) is equivalent to (3) with C given in (10) is equivalent to the new identity
with the limit conventions in (11) : Given (12) ; identity (13) is the limiting version of identity (14) as ! 1: To verify this claim, multiply (14) by (1 ), take logs, divide by (1 ) and use (12) to …nd
As ! 1; and therefore ! 1; the …rst term inside the curly brackets converges to P s q s log (x s ) and the second term converges to P s q s log (q s =p s ) ; thus reducing the above expression to (13) :
The following is an example of the dual representation of condition 3 of Theorem 11 that is a smooth analog to the MEU Example 9.
Example 14 Suppose that S = 2 (see Remark 12b) and the CE is given by (8) witĥ q = (1=2; 1=2) and 1 6 =^ > 6 = 1: Letting = (^ 1) = (^ ) ; the function C of the dual representation (3) is given by (10) ; which in this context becomes
Two examples of this function are graphed in Figure 1 on top of analogous examples in the MEU speci…cation of Example 9. The top, thick curve corresponds to^ = 3 and = 2; while the bottom, thin curve corresponds to^ = 1:1 and = 0:1.
We close with some remarks on the order of aggregation in expression (8) ; that is, the fact that roulette payo¤s are collapsed to their certainty equivalent …rst and the resulting horse-race payo¤ is collapsed to a certainty equivalent second. As noted in Remark 12a, ambiguity aversion is not relevant to this issue. Without ambiguity aversion, the roles of roulette and horse-race uncertainty are symmetric, except for R -monotonicity, which dictates the order of aggregation in (8) : The situation is analogous to the partial separation of time preferences and risk aversion in Epstein-Zin-Weil utility (see footnote 2), which over a single period is achieved by aggregating over states …rst and then over time. Similarly here, in order to achieve a partial separation of risk attitudes toward two risk sources, one source of risk is aggregated prior to the other. This paper has followed the tradition of GS in assuming that risk is aggregated prior to uncertainty (although the reverse order seems worthy of future research). The topic is further explored in Skiadas (2011) , where a minimal extension of Epstein-Zin-Weil utility to re ‡ect CE (8) is axiomatically established. It is also shown there that for small incremental risks, corresponding to Brownian or Poisson uncertainty, the order of aggregation becomes approximately irrelevant, a symmetry that becomes exact in the continuous-time version 13 of the utility in Schroder and Skiadas (2003) .
A Appendix: Other weak independence axioms
Theorem 5 established the utility functional form (3) for evaluating horse-race uncertainty. For = 1; this functional form corresponds to the speci…cation of MMR, which is characterized by Weak Certainty Independence (WCI). Moreover, we saw in Theorem 10 that if 6 = 1; the multiplicative variational form in (3) is consistent with WCI if and only if Certainty Independence (CI) is satis…ed, corresponding to an MEU representation. In the case in which 6 = 1 and CI is not satis…ed, the functional structure of (3) is related to formulations by CF and CMMM, but lacks an exact foundation based on weak independence conditions, rather than scale invariance. The purpose of this appendix is to close this gap, formulating weak independence axioms that characterize all functional forms for aggregating horse-race uncertainty in (3), without assuming scale invariance.
The relevant weak independence conditions, in addition to WCI (see Section 5), are listed below. Recall that denotes the constant payo¤ taking the value at all states.
Low-Constant Independence (LCI) For any x; y 2 X S and roulette event B; there exists " > 0 such that
High-Constant Independence (HCI) For any x; y 2 X S and roulette event B; there exists M > 0 such that
Suppose the CE representation of admits the representation (3) for some p 2 S ; 2 R and C 2 C : Then the following implications are easily seen to be true.
LCI and HCI are variants of Axiom 5 of CF and Axiom A.10 of CMMM. The latter formulates weak independence relative to a …xed reference outcome, while the former further assumes that the outcome is the worst possible. In our setting, there is no worst (or best) outcome -LCI is weak certainty independence relative to all su¢ ciently bad constant payo¤s, and HCI is weak certainty independence relative to all su¢ ciently good constant payo¤s.
We will show that in the absence of scale invariance, WCI, LCI and HCI entirely characterize the functional structure (3) toward horse-race uncertainty. For technical reasons, we will do so in a modi…ed model in which roulette outcomes are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] ; essentially embedding our earlier treatment in a model with objective roulette probabilities, just as in the related literature of GS, MMR, CF and CMMM.
For the remainder of this appendix, the roulette state space f1; : : : ; Rg is replaced with the unit interval [0; 1] : An objective distribution over roulette outcomes is given as Lebesgue measure on [0; 1] : A roulette event is now any Borel subset of [0; 1] : A roulette payo¤ is any Borel-measurable simple random variable of the form z : [0; 1] ! (0; 1) ; meaning that there exist …nitely many disjoint roulette events B 1 ; : : : ; B n and corresponding z 1 ; : : : ; z n 2 (0; 1)
A payo¤ is any mapping of the form x : [0; 1] f1; : : : ; Sg ! R such that for every horse-race state s; the section x s : [0; 1] ! R; de…ned by x s (r) = x (r; s) ; is a roulette payo¤. As before, we identify a roulette payo¤ with a payo¤ that does not depend on the horse-race state, while a horse-race payo¤ can be viewed as either a payo¤ that does not depend on the roulette state or an element of (0; 1) S :
As in Section 2, we take as given a relation on the set of payo¤s X; whose restriction on the set of roulette payo¤s X R (resp. horse-race payo¤s X S ) is denoted R (resp. S ). We further assume that R has a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) representation. For the purpose of this discussion, a vNM index is any increasing continuous function of the form u : (0; 1) ! R and is said to represent R if x R y is equivalent to Eu (x) > Eu (y) for all x; y 2 X R : We focus on the case in which R has an unbounded vNM representation u: Since we are free to choose any positive a¢ ne transformation of u; we assume, without loss of generality, that the image set of u is R or (0; 1) (meaning (0; 1) or ( 1; 0)).
The representation theorem that follows essentially modi…es Theorem 5 by replacing scale invariance with a weak independence axiom, which one depending on the image of u: The theorem refers to the set C of De…nition 4. Note that C depends on only through the image set u (0; 1) ; which can be R or (0; 1) :
Theorem 15 Suppose the vNM index u is such that u (0; 1) = R or u (0; 1) = (0; 1) ; and select any 2 R such that u (0; 1) = u (0; 1) : Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. The relation is an increasing, R -monotone and ambiguity-averse preference order, and S is continuous. Moreover, R has the vNM representation u; and satis…es WCI if u (0; 1) = R, LCI if u (0; 1) = (0; 1) ; and HCI if u (0; 1) = ( 1; 0) : 2. The CE : X ! (0; 1) representing exists and takes the form
for some C 2 C :
Suppose these two conditions are satis…ed. The function C can be uniquely selected so that if representation (15) is also valid with any C : S ! R + [ f1g in place of C; then C C if 1; and C C if > 1: Moreover, the following are true:
CI is satis…ed if and only if C takes the form of condition 3 of Theorem 6. For u (0; 1) = (0; 1) ; CI is satis…ed if and only if WCI is satis…ed.
Assuming S > 2; the preference order S on X S is separable if and only if C takes the form of condition 3 of Theorem 11.
Remark 16 Representation (15) corresponds to one form of the function f that maps the vector (Eu x 1 ; : : : ; Eu x S ) to u (x) : If CI is satis…ed, then f can alternatively be expressed as f (z) = min q2K q z for some (unique) K 2 K; by the same argument used in Theorem 6. (This fact is of course known from GS.) If S > 2 and S is separable, then f is alternatively given by Example 26 if u (0; 1) = R and Example 27 if u (0; 1) = (0; 1) ; just as in the proof of Theorem 11.
In the case u (0; 1) = R; the utility representation (15) and the characterization of the entropic form (9) are familiar thanks to MMR and Strzalecki (2011), respectively. In this case, the function C of (15) is unique in C 1 (see Remark 24), just as in the context of Theorem 5 for = 1:
The case u (0; 1) = (0; 1) is related to CF and Theorem 26 of CMMM, but is di¤erent in terms of the restrictions placed on C; re ‡ecting the di¤erence between LCI or HCI and the corresponding weak-independence assumptions of CF and CMMM. The characterization in the case of separable S with u (0; 1) = (0; 1) and C given by (10) is new.
B Appendix: Proof of representation theorems
This appendix proves the theorems of the main part of the paper and Appendix A, and explains their underlying structure. The …rst section presents a key representation theorem for scale-invariant separable preferences that is of interest in its own right. The second section relates preference properties to primal CE representations. The third section develops convex duality results that in conjunction with the primal representations lead to the multiple-prior representations of the main results, whose proofs are concluded in the last …ve sections. Omitted lemma proofs can be found in Appendix C.
B.1 Scale-invariant separable preferences
In preparation for the main analysis, this section states and proves Theorem 17, providing a characterization of scale-invariant separable preferences. The result, which is of interest in its own right, improves Theorem 3.37 of Skiadas (2009) by removing the non-ordinal assumption that the utility is continuously di¤erentiable in some arbitrarily small neighborhood. As discussed in the Introduction, the remarkable aspect of Theorem 17 is that separability together with scale invariance substitute for a more elaborate SEU theory on a …nite state space, delivering the power-or-logarithmic expected utility structure under a unique probability. Related insights were provided by Hens (1992) and Werner (2005) . Hens noted that if a continuously di¤erentiable additive utility has a constant marginal rate of substitution along the certainty line, then it must take the form of expected utility. Werner showed that an additive utility that is more risk averse than risk risk-neutral relative to an exogenously given probability must be expected utility relative to this probability. These arguments are not special to scale invariant preferences, but rely on non-ordinal assumptions. Theorem 17 on the other hand makes only ordinal assumptions-utility smoothness and the existence of the unique probability p are all consequences of these ordinal assumptions, as is the fact that the utility is either (globally) risk averse or risk seeking.
Theorem 17 is stated in terms of a binary relation on (0; 1) n ; for some positive integer n: (This is not the same as in the main part of the paper-the result will be applied to R with n = R and to S with n = S:) We refer to De…nition 1 for the meaning of the terms increasing, continuous, scale-invariant and preference order. We also use De…nition 3:
is separable if x A z y A z implies x A z 0 y A z 0 ; for all x; y; z; z 0 2 (0; 1) n and A f1; : : : ; ng ; where
We refer to (1) and (2) for the de…nition of the notation n and u :
Theorem 17 Suppose is a binary relation on (0; 1) n for an integer n > 2: Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. is an increasing, continuous, separable and scale-invariant preference order.
2. There exist unique p 2 n and 2 R such that
Proof. Clearly, the second condition implies the …rst one (even without uniqueness of p and ). Conversely, suppose that satis…es the …rst condition. By Debreu's additive representation theorem (see Debreu (1983) , Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky (1971) and Wakker (1988) ), there exist increasing and continuous functions U i : (0; 1) ! R such that
Moreover, the representation is unique up to a positive a¢ ne transformation: If (17) holds for functionsŨ i : (0; 1) ! R in place of the U i ; there exist a 2 (0; 1) and b 2 R n such thatŨ i = aU i + b i for all i: Given any s 2 (0; 1) ; scale invariance states that x y () sx sy; and therefore the functionsŨ i (z) = U i (sz) de…ne another additive representation of : There exist, therefore, functions a : (0; 1) ! (0; 1) and b : (0; 1) ! R n such that
Let us also de…ne the functions f i ; h; k i : R ! R by
We can then restate restriction (18) as 
or f i (x) = i e (1 )x 1 + i and h (x) = e (1 )x ; with 6 = 1:
(The fact that h does not depend on i implies that also does not depend on i:) The above conditions on the f i can be summarized as
After a positive a¢ ne transformation of the U i ; we can set i = p i for some p 2 n and i = 0: Uniqueness of the additive representation (17) ; up to a positive a¢ ne transformation, implies there is a unique choice of p 2 n and 2 R that is consistent with representation (16) :
B.2 Primal CE representation
Up to the …nal Section B.8, where Theorem 15 is proved, we assume the …nite state-space setting of Section 2. This section's focus is on primal CE representations. Corresponding multiple-prior representations are derived in the next section by convex duality arguments.
De…nition 18 Suppose D R is an interval. A certainty equivalent (CE) on D S is any increasing and continuous function f : D S ! D with the property f ( 1) = for all 2 D: The CE f is de…ned to be
From Section 2, recall that is a relation on the set of payo¤s X and R is its restriction on the set of roulette payo¤s X R :
Lemma 19 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. is a continuous, increasing and R -monotone preference order, and R is separable and scale invariant.
p r u x 1 r ; : : : ;
for unique p 2 R ; 2 R and CE f on u (0; 1) S :
Proof. That (2 =) 1) is clear (even without uniqueness). Conversely, suppose condition 1 is satis…ed. Since is a continuous, increasing preference order,
de…nes a CE that represents : Applying Theorem 17 to R , it follows that there exist unique p 2 R and 2 R such that x R y is equivalent to P r p r u (x r ) > P r p r u (y r ) for all x; y 2 X R : The fact that is increasing and R -monotone implies that the function f : D S ! D is well-de…ned by (20). Indeed, suppose x; y 2 X are such that P r p r u (x s r ) = P r p r u (y s r ) ; and therefore x s R y s for every s: For any " > 0; (x + "1) s y s ; and therefore (x + "1) > (y) by R -monotonicity. Letting " # 0; we have (x) (y) : By symmetry, (x) = (y) ; and therefore f takes the same value whether it is de…ned in terms of x or y in (20) : The proof that f is a unique CE is also straightforward and is left to the reader. Proof. (a) The "if" part is immediate. Conversely, suppose is ambiguity-averse. Fix any B f1; : : : ; Rg such that P r2B p r 2 (0; 1) : Then for any horse-race payo¤s x; y 2 X S ; we can write
Given representation (20), ambiguity aversion requires that for all x; y 2 X S ; L f u x 1 ; : : : ; u x S = f u y 1 ; : : : ; u y
The same condition can be stated more simply as
Because f is increasing and continuous, condition (22) is equivalent to
To see why, suppose x; y 2 u (0; 1) S satisfy f (x) > f (y) : Pick any z 2 u (0; 1) S such that z x; y and let = x z 0:
Let 2 (0; 1) be such that h ( ) = f (y) : By monotonicity and (22), we conclude that f ( x + (1 ) y) f ( (x ) + (1 ) y) f (y) : This proves (23) : Applying the same conclusion with the complement of B in place of B; and the notation for x and y interchanged, we also have
Using (23) and (24) together, we show that f is quasiconcave. For any given z 2 u (0; 1) S ; we are to prove that the set C fx : f (x) f (z)g is convex. Suppose x; y 2 C:
This is not quite the de…nition of convexity of C, since is …xed, but it implies convexity of C given the continuity of f: To show this claim, let J 0 = f0; 1g and J n+1 = f + (1 ) : ; 2 J n g ; n = 1; 2; : : : The set J = S 1 n=1 J n is dense in [0; 1]. Fix any x and y in C and consider the set K = f 2 [0; 1] : x + (1 ) y 2 Cg. An induction using (25) shows that J K. Since K is closed and contains a dense subset of [0; 1], it contains all of [0; 1] : Therefore C is convex.
(b) Expression (21) implies that is scale invariant if and only if is SI (that is, homogeneous of degree one). Given this observation, the claim is immediate from the de…nitions.
(c) We prove the "only if" part, the converse being straightforward. Suppose WCI is satis…ed and …x any roulette event B such that P r2B p r 2 (0; 1) : Suppose we are given any a; b 2 u (0; 1) S , and t 2 R is such that a + t1; b + t1 2 u (0; 1) S : Suppose further that t is restricted so that t (1 ) > 0: It is then not hard to show that there exist x; y 2 X S and ; 2 (0; 1) such that
(The idea is to pick so that u ( ) is close to zero: if = 1 choose = 1; if < 1 choose very small, and if > 1 choose very large. Given su¢ ciently small u ( ) ; clearly x and y can be selected to satisfy the stated condition, while can be chosen to be positive thanks to the assumed restriction t (1 ) > 0:) The assumed structure of the
Consider now any z 2 u (0; 1) S such that z + t1 2 u (0; 1) S : De…nition 18 implies that f (z) 2 u (0; 1) : Consider any " > 0 su¢ ciently small so that f (z) + " 2 u (0; 1) : Applying (26) with a = (f (z) + ") 1 and b = z shows that
Since this is true for every su¢ ciently small " > 0; we have f (z) + t f (z + t1). Similarly, applying (26) with a = z and b = (f (a) ") 1 for su¢ ciently small " > 0; we conclude that f (z) + t f (z + t1) : We have therefore proved that f (z + t1) = f (z) + t for any z 2 u (0; 1) S and t 2 R such that z+t1 2 u (0; 1) S and t (1 ) > 0: The last inequality entails no loss of generality, as we can always relabel z + t1 as z and ‡ip the sign of t: This completes the proof that f is TI.
B.3 Dual CE representation
The dual, multiple-prior version of the representation of Lemma 19 will be based on the following result, which can be understood in terms of basic demand theory, but whose application to uncertainty aversion is an insight of CMMM. A proof is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 21 Suppose D R is an open connected interval and the function f : D S ! D is increasing, continuous and quasiconcave. Let the function G :
Then for every x 2 D S ; f (x) = min
The following technical lemma, which is proved in Appendix C, will be key in showing that C is strictly positive if > 1: (The lemma's nontrivial part shows that F stays bounded away from zero on the boundary of (0; 1) S \ fx : q x = 1g :)
Lemma 22 Suppose that F : (0; 1) S ! (0; 1) is increasing, convex, homogeneous of degree one and satis…es F (1) = 1: Then inf fF (x) : q x = 1g > 0 for every q 2 (0; 1) S :
Recall the notation u for the function de…ned by (2) and C for the set of De…nition 4. Note that C depends on only through the image set u (0; 1) : The duality of Lemma 21 is specialized in this paper as follows.
Lemma 23 Suppose that f : D S ! D is a CE and either D = R and f is TI, or D = (0; 1) and f is SI. Then the function G : (27) takes the form
where C : (0; 1)
The restriction of C to S is an element of C ; for any such that D = u (0; 1) :
Proof. The validity of (29) and (30) follows easily from the de…nitions. Fix any 2 R such that D = u (0; 1) : We verify that the restriction of C on S is in C by considering cases.
Case of D = R and f TI (and therefore = 1). Setting x = 1 in (28) and using (29) shows that min C = 0: We extend C by letting C (q) = sup x2R S ff (x) : q x = 0g for all q 2 S : We show that C : S ! R + [ f1g is lower semicontinuous by showing that its epigraph is a closed set. Suppose we have a sequence (q n ; n ) in the epigraph C that converges to (q; ) 2 S R: We are to show that (q; ) is also in the epigraph of C, which is to say that q x = 0 implies f (x)
: Consider any x 2 R S such that q x and let x n = x + 1 (n ) x; which converges to x as n ! 1: By construction, q n x n = 0 and therefore f (x n ) n (since (q n ; n ) is in the epigraph of C). Letting n ! 1 and using the continuity of f it follows that f (x) ; completing the proof of the lower semicontinuity of C: We show the convexity of C by con…rming that that for any given q 1 ; q 2 2 S ;
This inequality is equivalent to
Consider any x 2 R S such that q 1 + q 2 x = 0: Then the preceding inequality follows if we can produce x 1 and x 2 such that
This is achieved by setting x 1 = x + q 2 x 1 and x 2 = x + q 1 x 1: The fact that 1 q 1 = 1 q 2 = 1 and q 1 + q 2 x = 0 implies the …rst two equalities in (31) : The fact that f is TI implies that f x 1 = f (x) + q 2 x and f x 2 = f (x) + q 1 x. Adding the last two equations and using q 1 + q 2 x = 0 gives the last equality of (31) : This completes that proof that C is convex on S :
Case of D = (0; 1) and f SI (and therefore < 1). Given any q 2 (0; 1) S ; let m = max q 1 1 ; : : : ; q 1 S : Then x 2 (0; 1) S and q x 1 implies x m1: Since f is increasing, the de…nition of C (q) in (30) implies that C (q) f (m1) = m; and therefore C is …nite-valued. Setting x = 1 in (28) and using (29) shows that min fC (q) : q 2 S g = 1:
Basic demand theory tells us that C is quasiconvex, and therefore 1=C is quasiconcave. Since f is SI, it can easily be con…rmed that 1=C is homogeneous of degree one on (0; 1) S ;
and therefore a concave function.
Case of D = ( 1; 0) and f SI (and therefore > 1). Consider any q 2 (0; 1) S : Since f is increasing, the constraint q x 1 in the de…nition of C in (30) is binding. We use Lemma 22 with F (x) = f ( x) to conclude that C (q) > 0 for every q 2 (0; 1) S :
Arguing as in the last case, C is quasiconcave and therefore 1=C is quasiconvex. Moreover, 1=C is homogeneous of degree one and therefore convex on S : Setting x = 1 in (28) and using (29) shows that max fC (q) : q 2 S g = 1:
Expression (29) means that (28) can be restated as
Remark 24 Suppose f is TI on R S and C 2 C 1 satis…es (32) : By De…nition 4, C is the restriction to S of a convex, lower semicontinuous function C on S : We extend C to all of R S by letting C (q) = 1 for q = 2 S : It follows that F (x) f ( x) = max q fq x C (q)g ; meaning that F is the Fenchel-Legendre conjugate of C: As shown in Section 12 of Rockafellar (1970) , we can invert this relationship to write C (q) = sup x fq x F (x)g (which is the Lagrangian dual of C (q) = sup x ff (x) : q x 0g given that f is TI). In particular, C is uniquely determined in C 1 given f:
The uniqueness of an extremal C consistent with representation (32) is spelled out in the following result.
Lemma 25 Under the same assumptions as Lemma 23, suppose that C is de…ned by (30) ; is such that D = u (0; 1) ; and (32) is satis…ed with C : S ! R [ f1g in place of C: Then C C if 1; and C C if > 1:
Proof. Fixing any q 2 S ; we show that C (q) C (q) if 1 and C (q) C (q) if > 1, by considering cases.
Case of D = R and f TI. Let L (q) = x 2 R S : q x = 0 : For any x 2 L (q) ; setting p = q implies p x + C (p) = C (q). Therefore,
This in turn implies
Case of D = (0; 1) and f SI. Let L (q) = x 2 R S : q x = 1 : For any x 2 L (q) ; setting p = q implies (p x) C (p) = C (q) : Therefore,
Again (33) must hold.
The following two examples, which are essential in proving Theorems 11 and 15, establish the form of duality (32) when f is a TI or SI CE representing a separable and convex preference order. It follows from Theorem 17 that if f is TI (which is to say exp f log is SI) then it must take the form of Example 26 and if f is SI it must take the form of Example 27.
Example 26 Given parameter 2 (0; 1] ; de…ne the TI CE : R S ! R by
For f = ; duality (32) takes the form
This is a well-known identity that already appears in Donsker and Varadhan (1975) . It can also be easily veri…ed by computing C using (30) :
Example 27 Given parameter 2 [ 1; 1) [ (1; 1] ; de…ne the SI CE as follows.
for x 2 (0; 1) S and 2 [ 1; 1) ;
; for x 2 ( 1; 0) S and 2 (1; 1] : For = 0 or 1; the above expressions are interpreted by taking a limit:
; with the convention (11) for 2 f0; 1g : The expression for C is easily veri…ed using (30) :
B.4 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of Theorem 5 amounts to compiling earlier lemmas. That 2 =) 1 is straightforward to con…rm. Conversely, suppose condition 1 is satis…ed. Applying Lemma 19, we obtain the primal representation ( 
B.5 Proof of Theorem 6
We show the equivalence of the three conditions; uniqueness is a corollary of Theorem 5.
(2 =) 1) Straightforward and left to the reader.
(1 =) 2) Assuming the conditions of Theorem 5, we use CI to establish the MEU representation (4) of the second condition. As in the last proof, Lemma 19 implies representation (20) for unique p 2 R ; 2 [0; 1) and CE f on u (0; 1) S : We treat the cases = 1 and 6 = 1 separately.
Case of = 1: In this case, we know from the preceding analysis that f is TI and admits the representation (32) for a unique (see Remark 24) C 2 C 1 ; given by Lemma 23 as
We use CI to establish that there exists a positive scalar s 6 = 1 such that
Given the assumption R > 2; there exist distinct roulette events A and B; with respective probabilities A = P r2A p r and B = P r2B p r : We will verify (35) for s = A = B : CI implies
; for all x 2 X S and 2 (0; 1) :
By identity (20) de…ning f (with u = log), condition (36) is equivalent to
where log x = log x 1 ; : : : ; log x S : Making the change of variables s = A = B ; z = B log x and l = B log ; condition (37) can be restated as f (sz) > sl () f (z) > l for all z 2 R S and l 2 R; a condition that is clearly equivalent to the claimed condition (35) :
Combining (34) and (35), we have C (q) = sup ff (sz) : q (sz) 0g = s sup ff (z) : q z 0g = sC (q) :
Since s 6 = 1; it follows that C (q) 2 f0; 1g. We have shown that C can only take the values 0 or 1 on the open set S ; and therefore C = K ; where K = fq 2 S : C (q) = 0g ; corresponding to the MEU representation (4) : Clearly, K is nonempty and convex. There remains to show that K is closed. Since C is lower semicontinuous on S ; it is enough to show that for any q on the boundary of S ; C (q) ! 1 as q ! q: Suppose instead that there is a sequence (q 1 ; q 2 ; : : : ) in S that convergences to a point q on the boundary of S ; while C (q n ) = 0 for all n: Let s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg be such that q s = 0: Relabeling horserace states if necessary, we assume s = 1: The corresponding sequence of …rst components, q 1 1 ; q 1 2 ; : : : ; converges to zero. Let " n = q 1 n = q 1 n 1 , which converges to zero as n ! 1: Since C (q n ) = 0 and q 1 n + 1 q 1 n " n = 0; it follows from (34) that f (1; " n ; : : : ; " n ) 0 for all n: Letting n ! 1; this implies f (1; 0; : : : ; 0) 0; since f is continuous. On the other hand, f is a CE in the sense of De…nition 18, which implies f (1; 0; : : : ; 0) > f (0) = 0; a contradiction.
Case of 6 = 1: In this case, we know from Lemma 20 that f is quasiconcave and both SI (since is SI) and TI (by WCI, which is implied by CI). The domain of f is u (0; 1) S ; where u (0; 1) = (0; 1) : The function f has a unique TI extension to all of R S : To verify this claim, for any x 2 R S , de…ne f (x) = f (x + t1) t for any t 2 R such that x + t1 2 u (0; 1) S : Since f is TI on u (0; 1) S ; any such choice of t gives the same value f (x) : Given the TI property, the extension just given is clearly unique. It is now straightforward to check that the unique TI extension of f to R S preserves scale invariance, quasiconcavity and the CE property of f . For instance, for any x 2 R S ; s 2 (0; 1) ; and t 2 R such that x + t1 2 u (0; 1) S ; it is also the case that sx + st1 2 u (0; 1) S and
This shows that f is SI on R S : Other claimed properties of f can be shown similarly by translating the property to be proved to u (0; 1) S : Applying Lemma 23, we can now complete the proof just as for = 1; except here (35) need not be proved, as we already know f is SI.
(2 () 3) This follows directly from Proposition 8, but it is worth noting that the claimed expression (5) for C follows easily from (30) with f (z) = min 2K z: For example, suppose that < 1; and therefore C (q) = max ff (x) : x 2 L (q)g, where we have used the fact that f is increasing and q is strictly positive, which implies that L (q) is compact. Since K is also compact, we can apply the Minimax Theorem to conclude that
The case > 1 is analogous, while the case = 1 is trivial.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 10
We assume the validity of the two equivalent conditions of Theorem 5 and we show parts (a) and (b) together. The case = 1 is straightforward-representation (3) coincides with (7) for a unique C = C; and WCI is implied by this representation. Suppose now that 6 = 1: As in the last two proofs, Lemma 19 implies representation (20) for unique p 2 R ; 2 R and a CE f on u (0; 1) S ; which is quasiconcave and SI by Lemma 20. For the case 6 = 1; the preceding proof of the part 1 =) 2 of Theorem 6 only used WCI (rather than the stronger condition CI). Therefore, assuming 6 = 1; WCI implies the validity of condition 2 of Theorem 6, and therefore the validity of CI. Of course, representation (7) implies WCI and therefore the same condition. Moreover, the function C in (7) is unique by Remark 24, which is to say that C = K :
B.7 Proof of Theorem 11 and Remark 12
Suppose that condition 1 of Theorem 5 is satis…ed, except need not be ambiguity averse, for now. Let also ; f; p and be de…ned by the second condition of Lemma 19. Adding the assumption that S is separable, we can apply Theorem 17 to S to conclude that there exist uniquep 2 S and^ 2 R such that the restriction of the CE on the set of horse-race lotteries is given by u^ (x) = P sp s u^ (x s ) ; x 2 X S : Representation (20), on the other hand, implies that u (x) = f u x 1 ; : : : ; u x S ; x 2 X S :
Combining the last two equations, we have
Using this f back in the CE expression (20) gives the claimed representation (8). By Lemma 20, is ambiguity averse if and only if f is quasiconcave, a condition that is clearly equivalent to^ ; given expression (38) : This proves that 1 =) 2 and the analogous statement of Remark 12. The converse is straightforward and left to the reader.
Assuming ambiguity aversion, the equivalence 2 () 3 corresponds to the duality of Lemmas 21 and 23 for the speci…c function f de…ned in (38) : With and de…ned in (12) ; condition (38) can be restated as follows:
Examples 26 and 27 apply, resulting in the claimed dual representation with C given by expressions (9) and (10), with the limiting interpretations (11) :
B.8 Proof of Theorem 15
We assume the setting, notation and terminology of Appendix A, in which the roulette state space is the unit interval. Lemmas 19 and 20 in this context are modi…ed as follows.
Lemma 28 Suppose the relation S on X S is a continuous, increasing preference order, the relation R on X R has the vNM representation u; and is R -monotone. Then the CE on X representing exists and takes the form
for a unique CE f on u (0; 1) S : Moreover, the following are true: Proof. A CE S : X S ! (0; 1) representing the preference order S on horse-race lotteries is well-de…ned by S (x) = inf f 2 (0; 1) : 1 xg : We extend this CE to the whole of X by letting
It is straightforward to con…rm that : X ! (0; 1) is a CE. Let us now show that represents : Given any x 2 X; let x s = u 1 Eu (x s ) ; s = 1; : : : ; S; which de…nes a horse-race payo¤ x: By construction x s 1 R x s for every s: Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 19, using the R -monotonicity of ; we have x y if and only if x y; which is in turn equivalent to S ( x) > S ( y) : By construction, (x) = S ( x) for every x 2 X: This completes the proof that represents : Equation (40) follows from (41) with f (y) = u S u 1 y 1 ; : : : ; u 1 y S :
Finally, we prove claims (a)-(d). Making the change of variables a = u (x) and b = u (y) ; LCI can be restated as the requirement that for any given roulette event B and corresponding probability = (B) ; and for any a; b 2 (0; 1) S ; there exists small enough " > 0 such that f (a) > f (b) if and only if for all 2 (0;
Since u ( ) ! 0 as ! 0 and f is continuous, the last part of this condition is equivalent to for all a; b 2 (0; 1) S and 2 (0;
Applying the last equivalence with 1 a and 1 b in place of a and b; it is easy to see that the preceding condition is equivalent to for all a; b 2 (0; 1) S and s 2 (0; 1) ; f (a) > f (b) () f (sa) > f (sb) :
Since f is a CE, the last condition is equivalent to f being SI (as shown, for example, in Section 3.5.1 of Skiadas (2009)).
(c) Similar to the proof of part (b).
(d) The equivalence of ambiguity aversion and quasiconcavity of f follows by the same argument as for Lemma 20(a). (As with part (a), the argument can be simpli…ed in this context, since ambiguity aversion implies that (22) holds for every 2 (0; 1) :)
The equivalence 1 () 2 of Theorem 15 follows analogously to the corresponding equivalence of Theorem 5 in the last section, with Lemma 28 in place of Lemmas 19 and 20. That 2 =) 1 is immediate. Conversely, Lemma 28 gives representation (40) for a quasiconcave CE f that is TI or SI according to (a)-(c) (and therefore also concave). Lemmas 21 and 23 imply that f can be expressed, for some C 2 C , as in (32), which in combination with representation (40) gives the main representation (15) : An application of Lemma 25 shows the existence of a unique extremal C 2 C consistent with (15) :
Suppose now the Theorem's two equivalent conditions are satis…ed, and therefore u (x) = f u x 1 ; : : : ; u x S ; x 2 X S ;
for a CE f that is either TI on R S or SI on (0; 1) S : We show the theorem's two bullet points. In both cases, the "if" part is immediate, so we focus on the "only if" part. For the …rst bullet point, suppose CI is satis…ed. If u (0; 1) = R; we assume, without loss of generality, that u (1) = 1, in which case we can apply the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 6 for the special case u = log : Similarly, if u (0; 1) = (0; 1) (resp.
( 1; 0)), we can apply the argument used to prove Theorem 6 for the case < 1 (resp. > 1), while the claim regarding WCI follows just as for Theorem 10. For the second bullet point, de…ne the SI CE on (0; 1) S by (x) = 8 > < > :
exp f log x 1 ; : : : ; log x S ; if u (0; 1) = R and f is TI, f x 1 ; : : : ; x S ; if u (0; 1) = (0; 1) and f is SI, f x 1 ; : : : ; x S ; if u (0; 1) = ( 1; 0) and f is SI, Suppose that S is separable. Then the preference order on (0; 1) S represented by satis…es the conditions of Theorem 17. There exist, therefore, unique 0 andp 2 S such that
Solving for f; we …nd that it takes the forms (39) ; for any such that u (0; 1) = u (0; 1) ; with^ = if u (0; 1) = R; and with^ such that 1 = (1 ^ ) = (1 ) if u (0; 1) = (0; 1) : The proof is completed just as for Theorem 11.
C Appendix: Remaining proofs
This Appendix collects all proofs omitted so far.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 8
We …rst show that min 
The inequality holds because the left-hand side cannot increase if the operator max z2L(q) is replaced with max z2f yg ; where y = (q y) 1 y 2 L (q) : After this replacement, the factor q y cancels out giving the right-hand side of (42). Similarly, the left-hand side of (42) does not decrease if min q2 S is replaced with min q2K ; and min 2K is replaced with min 2fqg ; resulting in 
(The last equality is true because q z = 1 for every z 2 L (q) :) Inequalities (42) and (43) imply identity (6), albeit with min q2 S instead of min q2 S on the right-hand side. But if the minimizing q were on the boundary of S ; then we would have max z2L(q) z = 1 for all 2 K; contradicting (43) (whose right-hand side is positive and …nite). Finally, interchanging the roles of min and max in (6) simply reverses inequalities (42) and (43) ; with analogous reasoning.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 21
Fix any x 2 D S : By the de…nition of G; it is clear that f (x) G (q x; q) for all q 2 S : We must therefore demonstrate the existence of one q 2 S such that f (x) = G (x q; q) : By the supporting hyperplane theorem, there is a nonzero q in R S that supports the convex set y 2 D S : f (y) > f (x) at x; meaning that f (y) > f (x) =) q y q x:
Since f is increasing, if 2 R S + is nonzero and small enough so that x + 2 D S ; we have f (x + ) > f (x) and therefore q 0: Therefore, 0 6 = q 0: Next we show that
Suppose q y q x. For every " > 0 small enough so that y "q 2 D S ; we have q (y "q) < q x and therefore f (y "q) f (x) by (44) : Letting " go to zero, it follows that f (y) f (x) ; con…rming (45) : Applying the latter with y = x + for all nonzero su¢ ciently small 2 R S + shows that that q is in fact strictly positive. After positive scaling, we can further assume that q 2 S : The proof is now complete, since (45) is a restatement of the condition f (x) = G (q x; q) :
C.3 Proof of Lemma 22
Fix any q 2 (0; 1) S and let K = n x 2 (0; 1) S : q x = 1 o : Since K is compact, we can select a sequence x (n) in K that converges to some x 2 K such that F ( x) lim n!1 F (x (n) ) = inf F: If x 2 K; then inf F = F ( x) > 0: Suppose now that x is on the boundary of K; meaning that at least one of the coordinates of x vanishes. Relabeling the coordinates if necessary, we assume that 
and y (n) x (n) ; we have H (L; 0) lim
We complete the proof by showing that H (L; 0) > 0:
Note that H inherits the assumed properties of F; that is, it is increasing, convex, homogeneous of degree one and satis…es H (1; 1) = 1: Let the function G : (0; 1) ! R be the increasing, convex function de…ned by G (r) = H (1; r) : Since H is homogeneous of degree one, H (a; b) = a G b a ; a; b 2 (0; 1) :
Let r (n) = b (n) =a (n) : The limit (46) implies that lim n!1 r (n) = 0 and
By the convexity of G; for all n large enough so that r (n) < 1; we have the slope inequality
This proves that
By the monotonicity of H; we have G (2) 2 = H 1 2 ; 1 < H (1; 1) = 1:
Therefore 2 G (2) > 0; which combined with (49) and (48) proves that H (L; 0) > 0 and therefore inf F > 0 by (47) :
